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THE POWER OF A CORPORATION TO
ACQUIRE ITS OWN STOCK
There are two general views of corporate capacity. The first
view regards a corporation as possessed of general capacity,
by which is meant that the corporation may do anything that
a natural person can do, unless the act is either expressly or
impliedly prohibited by its charter.' This theory has met with
little favor in the United States. In this country, the doctrine
of special corporate capacity has been almost universally
adopted.2  Under this view, a corporation possesses only the
powers conferred upon it in its charter, together with those
powers which are incidental to, or consequential upon, or reason-
ably necessary for effectuating the main powers conferred. And
in the case of the ordinary private corporation, American courts
are inclined to take a liberal view of its powers, inclining more
and more to hold that if the sovereign state does not intervene,
there is no valid reason for confining the operations of the
ordinary private corporation too closely."
Implied powers are presumed to exist to enable corporate
bodies to carry out the express powers granted, in order ade-
quately to accomplish the purposes of their creation. Suppose
no express power is conferred upon a corporation to acquire
'South Yorkshire R. Co. v. Great Northern R. Co., 9 Exch. 84. But
see Ashbury Railroad Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche, L. R. 7 H. L. 653.
'Thomas v. West Jersey R. Co., 1o U. S. 71; Franklin Bank v. Com-
nzercial Bank, 36 Oh. St. 350.
'See Harris v. Independence Gas Co, 76 Kans. 750, Canfield &
Wormser's Cases on Priv. Corps., 337.
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its own shares. The question arises whether the corporation
may make such a purchase or whether it is outside of and
beyond the limit of its powers. Perhaps on no subject in the
law of corporations is there more conflict of authority.4
At the outset it seems necessary to distinguish two much
abused terms, namely, "Power" and "Right." Much difficulty
arises from the unfortunate use by courts of the term "Power."
In the last analysis, a corporation has power to do almost any-
thing. The question is not so much whether it has the power
to do the act, as to whether it has the right to do the act. A and
B enter into a contract. A assuredly has the power to break the
agreement, but that does not give A the right to break it,
Mr. Justice Holmes notwithstanding. Suppose a corporation
is organized to purchase and sell groceries at retail. It has
the might, it has the power, but surely not the right to purchase
and operate a circus and menagerie. Yet, courts speak illogically
of the want of corporate power to purchase the circus and
menagerie. The terminology misleads and confuses. There
can be no question but that a corporation has the power to acquire
its own shares. No well considered case in any jurisdiction
should question this. The issue is solely one as to the right of
the corporation to do so.
On the question of right, there exist two lines of decisions.
One line enunciates what may be termed the English rule; the
other what may be termed the American rule. The English
view regards the purchase as ultra vires, unless the corporation
has been expressly authorized to buy its own shares. The lead-
ing case of Trevor v. Whitworth" assigns two main reasons for
this conclusion. First, it is said that if the corporation acquires
its shares with a view to selling them again, this is an unauthor-
ized speculation in its own stock, amounts to a trafficking in its
shares, and is ultra vires. On the other hand, if it is not
intended to reissue and part with the shares, then the purchase
amounts to an invalid and unauthorized reduction of its own
capital stock. It is insisted that the dilemma is perfect, and
that in either event, the purchase of its own stock is unlawful.
Quoting Lord Herschell:
"What was the reason which induced the company in
the present case to purchase its shares? If it was that
27 Harv. Law Rev. 747; 14 Col. Law Rev. 451.
12 Appeal Cases 409. And see, Hope v. International Financial Society,
4 Ch. Div. 327.
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they might sell them again, this would be a trafficking
in the shares, and clearly unauthorized. If it was to
retain them, this would be to my mind an indirect method
of reducing the capital of the company."
Neither of these reasons is altogether convincing. Nobody
would question the right of a corporation to sell shares of its
own stock which it acquired, for example, by gift" or by bequest.
7
Nobody would question the right of a corporation to part with
shares of its own stock which it had taken in payment of an
antecedent indebtedness.8 Yet, this, too, would be trafficking in
the corporation's own shares. Under a reasonably fair (not
liberal) view of corporate powers,9 there seems no adequate
reason for objecting to this in the absence of facts and circum-
stances tending to show fraud or impropriety. With regard
to the argument that the purchase is an indirect method of
reducing the corporate capital stock, it is a sufficient answer to
point out that the purchase is not necessarily a reduction.
10 The
shares are simply retired for the time being and may be reissued
at will. Quoting Judge Danforth of the Court of Appeals of
New York :"1
"In some way it (the corporation) had become the
owner of these shares, not for the purpose of diminishing
its capital stock, but for enjoyment as property. As such
they stood upon its books, until in the regular transac-
tion of business the stock was transferred to Conkling.
The company had a right to hold it unextinguished, and
a right to reissue it."
This also answers the contention of the authorities and text
writers who insist that a purchase by a corporation of its own
'Lake Superior Co. v. Drexel, go N. Y. 87.
"Rivanna N. Co. v. Dawson, 3 Gratt. (Va.) g.
'Coppin v. Greenless & Ransom Co., 38 Oh. St. 275.
'As to what is the appropriate test for construction of implied powers,
see the opinion of Vice Chancellor Bacon in London Financial Ass. v.
Kelk, 26 Ch. Div. 107, 134, Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 2o5, note.
10 Western Imp. Co. v. Des Moines Nat. Bk., lO3 Iowa 455; City Bank
of Columbus v. Bruce, 17 N. Y. 507; State v. Smith, 48 Vt. 266; Howe
Co. v. Jones, 2r Tex. Civ. App. 198. In this regard, Morawetz, and
Machen who follows Morawetz, seem to err. Morawetz, Priv. Corps.
(2nd ed.), sec. 112; Machen, Modem Law of Corps., sec. 626. And
see, 27 Harv. Law Rev., 748-749, for a correct appreciation of the
situation.
' Vail v. Hamilton, 85 N. Y. 453, 457-8.
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shares is an unlawful method of reducing the capital stock,
not being the method provided for by law.1 2 The flaw in the
argument lies in the assumption that a purchase of its own
shares must necessarily involve a reduction of capital stock.
Another argument advanced in support of the English doctrine
is that the purchase of its own stock by a corporation operates
necessarily as a fraud upon creditors who deal with the corpora-
tion on the faith that the capital stock is paid up.13 A recent
text writer 4 thus voices it:-
"It is no answer to say that if the company is thoroughly
solvent, so that its assets after the purchase are still amply
sufficient for payment of all claims against it, the creditors
are not prejudiced. For, while the assets may still remain
sufficient, yet they are after the consummation of the
purchase, undeniably less by the amount of the purchase
money than they were before; and hence the fund which
the creditors had an absolute riglit to have preserved intact
for the payment of their claims, has been diminished
without their consent."
This argument involves several fallacies. Suppose no cred-
itors exist. Then, of course, the argument fails utterly. If there
are no creditors, how can creditors be injured? Suppose how-
ever, that there are creditors, but the purchase of its own
shares is made from a goodly surplus which the company has
been accumulating.' 5 Surely nobody would contend that the
corporate surplus is a fund "which its creditors had an absolute
right to have preserved intact for the payment of their claims."
That creditors must be injured by the corporate purchase of its
own stock, does not necessarily follow, and consequently the
rights of creditors furnish no conclusive argument in support of
the English doctrine. If creditors are injured by such a pur-
chase, they can be amply protected without going to the
extreme-quite unnecessary in order to protect them-of denying
to a corporation the right ever to acquire its own shares.' 6
'Thus see, M'Sherry, C. J., in Maryland Trust Co. v. Nat. Mech. Bk.,
1O2 Md. 6o8, especially 623-626.
" Trevor v. Whitworth, supra; Maryland Trust Co. v. Nat. Mech. Bk.,
supra; 2 Thomp., Corps., sec. 2,054 (erroneous "trust fund" argument).
14Machen, Modern Law of Corps., sec. 626.
See Hamor v. Taylor-Rice Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392: "Was the
money which the defendant undertook to pay him for his surrender of
stock to come out of any surplus or fund of net profits, on the one hand,
or on the other, out of the fund represented by the capital stock?"
" Clapp v. Peterson, lO4 Ill. 26.
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It is also urged that to permit a corporation to acquire its
own shares results unjustly since it increases the relative voting
strength of large stock holders, and results in giving undue
power to the majority.17  If no fraud or bad faith on the part
of the majority appears, this argument fails completely, and it
is elementary that if fraud or bad faith do appear, the minority
may obtain ample and adequate relief."' If abuse results, the
abuse should be stifled. But the corporation should not be
unduly hampered by laying down the arbitrary rule of non-
acquisition of its own shares, irrespective of good or bad purpose,
object and result.
Finally, the argument has been made that, viewed from the
theoretical standpoint, the acquisition by a corporation of its
own shares is anomalous. "It is inconsistent with the essential
nature of a company that it should become a member of itself."'19
And it is insisted that is precisely what a corporation does when
it acquires its own stock.2 0  Whatever validity this argument
may have, the courts following the English doctrine seem
estopped to assert it, since all of them permit a corporation to
take over its own stock in satisfaction of a debt due to it.21
In such instances, the theoretical inconsistency is ignored by them,
perhaps upon the assumption that necessity knows no law,--a
practical view, but a trifle illogical.
In the United States, several jurisdictions including Kansas,
Maryland, Missouri, New Hampshire, Ohio and Tennessee,
follow the English doctrine and deny that the right to acquire
its own shares should be implied as a corporate power.
22
National banks are forbidden by express statute to buy their
"Machen, Modern Law of Corps., sec. 626.
"As to powers of majority and rights of minority, see Canfield &
Wormser's Cases, 704-726. See also, Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., 70
Fed. 646.
9 In re Dronfield Silk Stone ,Co., 17 Ch. Div. 83. For a similar Con-
tinental point of view, see H. Staub, Kommentar zum Handelsgesetzbuch
(7th ed.) I, p. 679.
"Maryland Trust Co. v. Nat. Mech. Bk., lO2 Md. 6o8, 623-6.
'See Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 214, note.
' German Say. Bk. v. Wulfekubler, i Kans. 65; Maryland Trust Co.
v. Nat. Mech. Bk., iO2 Md. 6o8; St. Louis Carriage Mfg. Co. v. Hilbert,
24 Mo. App. 338; Currier v. Lebanon Slate Co., 56 N. H. 262; State v.
Oberlin Bldg. & Loan Assi., 35 Oh. St. 258; Cartwright v. Dickinson,
88 Tenn. 476. In many cases cited as supporting the English doctrine,
including some of the above, the language is obiter.
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own shares. 23 In England, "the Stock Exchange will not grant
a settling day, or allow a quotation to any company which pur-
ports to have the power of buying its own shares." 24  In
Germany, the Commercial Code (Sect. 226) forbids private
corporations from acquiring their own shares either in the
course of business or in pledge. Shares may not even be pur-
chased out of surplus. The only exception is where the purchase
of shares is necessary to carry out plans of retirement or
amortization. Even this must have been stipulated for in the
articles of association.25 The motive of the German provision
has been regarded as twofold: "First, because it is repugnant
to legal concepts that a corporation be its own shareholder, and
secondly, because the provision tends to prevent speculation in
the shares of the corporation by its officers and managers, who
might thus obtain unfair advantages on the credit of the
organization."2
In England and in American jurisdictions, which follow the
English view, an exception to the rule that a corporation cannot
traffic in its own stock, is admitted to exist, whereby the corpora-
tion is allowed to take its own stock as collateral, 27 or to effect
a compromise of a disputed claim against a stockholder,28 or in
satisfaction of a debt due to the corporation.29  "This exception
is supposed to rest on a necessity which arises in order to avoid
loss."30 It seems proper to say that several early cases only
held this limited proposition, but have been apparently used as
authorities for the broad proposition of a general right to
acquire. Thus, in Taylor v. Miami Exportation Company,31 it
was held in Ohio that a banking corporation might lawfully
'Rev. St. U. S., sec. 5201.
"4 Per Lord Macnaghten in Trevor v. Whitworth, supra.
'German Comm. Code, sec. 227. And even then, the purchase may
only be made out of the corporate surplus.
'Kuhn, A Comparative Study of the Law of Corporations, p. 123
(Columbia Univ., Studies in History, Economics and Public Law, vol.
XLIX, no. 2).
' Williams v. Savage Mfg. Co., 3 Md. Ch. 452.
' 5State v. Oberlin Bldg. & Loan Assn., supra; Morgan v. Lewis, 46
Oh. St. i.
'First Nat. Bk. v. Nat. Exch. Bk., 39 Md. 6oo; Maryland Trust Co. v.
Nat. Mech. Bk., supra; Taylor v. Miami Exp. Co., 6 Ohio 176; Coppin
v. Greenless &" Ransom Co., 38 Oh. St. 275, 279; Morgan v. Lewis,
supra. See also, Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 214, note.
"Mcllvaine, J., in Coppin v. Greenless & Ransom Co., supra.
"6 Ohio 176.
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receive shares of its own stock from a solvent debtor in dis-
charge of his indebtedness. In the early New York case, City
Bank of Columbus v. Bruce,22 it appeared that the board of
directors of a banking corporation passed a resolution that all
stockholders indebted to the bank on stock notes might pay
such debts to the bank in its shares of stock at a named per-
centage, and that almost one-half of the stock of the bank was
so surrendered. The Court of Appeals held, following the Ohio
case, that there was "no ground for questioning the validity of
this transaction." These two cases, at a later day, seem to have
been used as authority in support of much more than they
actually hold.' 3 Even national banks may take shares of their
own stock "to prevent loss upon a debt previously contracted in
good faith."3
The general American rule, in support of which is the decided
weight of authority, affirms that a corporation has implied power
to take its own shares, provided it does so in good faith and
without any injury to its creditors or stockholders.3 5 The under-
lying reason for the American doctrine, as it may be termed,
seems to be the feeling on the part of most American courts
that the English doctrine is far too narrow and rigid and unduly
ignores customary business demands. Thus, under the doctrine
of England, as has been seen, a purchase by a corporation of
its own shares is ultra vires, (i) Even though bona fide; (2)
Even though all the stockholders consent; (3) Even though
there is no defrauding of, or intent to defraud, creditors.
The American doctrine, however, carefully safeguards the
17 N. Y. 507.
"Thus see Chicago etc. R. Co. v. President etc. of Marseilles, 84 Ill.
643, Canfield & Wormser's Cases, 209. Cf. Angell & Ames, Corps.,
sec. 280.
"Rev. St. U. S., sec. 52O.
'Dalton Grocery Co. v. Blanton, 8 Ga. Sog; Clapp v. Peterson, lO4 Ill.
26; Dupee v. Boston Water Power Co., 114 Mass. 37; Porter v. Plymouth
Gold Mining Co., 29 Mont. 347; Chapman v. Iron Clad Rheostat Co., 62
N. J. L. 497 (statutory provision); City Bank of Columbus v. Bruce,
spra; Vail v. Hamilton, supra; Moses v. Soule, 63 Miso. Rep. (N. Y.)
2o3, 118 N. Y. Supp. 410; Adam v. New Eng. Inv. Co., 33 R. I. 193;
San Antonio Co. v. Sanger, 151 S. W. (Tex. Civ. App.) 11o4; State v.
Smith, 48 Vt. 266; U. S. Mineral Co. v. Camden, lo6 Va. 663; Gilchrist
v. Highfield, 14o Wis. 476; In re Castle Braid Co., 145 Fed. 224. See
also, Chicago etc. R. Co. v. President etc. of Marseilles, 84 II. 643, for
a review of the early authorities.
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exercise of this right. As said by the Supreme Court of
Illinois:
"If it was shown that the purchase was made to pro-
mote the interests of the officers of the company alone,
and not the stockholders generally, or if for the benefit
of a portion of the stockholders and not all, or for the
injury of all or only a portion of them, or if operated
to the injury of creditors, or would defeat the end for
which the body was created, or if it was done for any
other fraudulent purpose, then chancery could interfere."
The American doctrine fully recognizes that the exchange of
corporate property or cash for shares of its own stock, and can-
celling the stock, furnishes no equivalent for creditors. It must
not be supposed that this is not recognized, for it is. The pur-
chase must be in good faith and will only be upheld provided it
is made without intent to injure creditors and stockholders and
provided they are not, in fact, injured thereby.37
Some of the criticism leveled at the prevailing doctrine appar-
ently seems based upon the assumption that the corporate
majority may vote the shares acquired. The law, however, is
well settled that a corporation may not vote shares of its own
stock held by it, either directly or indirectly by a trustee.38
Suppose Corporation A acquires all the shares of stock of Cor-
poration B; suppose Corporation B acquires io shares of stock
in Corporation A; may Corporation B, through its accredited
agent for that purpose, vote the io shares of stock which it
owns in Corporation A at a meeting of the stockholders of
Corporation A? Is this a voting by Corporation A of its own
shares of stock? It seems clear that on principle, Corporation
B should have the right to vote its Io shares, under the prevail-
ing and orthodox entity doctrine. Corporation B is a distinct
and separate legal personality and juridicial body from Corpora-
tion A. Non sequitur, if Corporation B were organized or the
stock transfers made, solely in order to attain certain desired vot-
ing results, that the veil of entity might not be pierced, especially
if an improper or fraudulent purpose appeared. It must not be
Chicago etc. R. Co. v. President etc. of Marseilles, supra, Canfield &
Wormser's Cases, 209, 211.
"7 Clapp v. Peterson, supra.
"Amer. R. Frog Co. v. Haven, ioi Mass. 398; Ex parte Holmes, 5
Cow. (N. Y.) 426. See also, Cook, Corps. (7th ed.), sec. 613.
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supposed that the doctrine of corporate entity can be employed as
a species of legal whitewash.30
Several situations present themselves under the prevailing
American doctrine. First, suppose the contract of purchase is
made and payment completed while the corporation is solvent.
Under such circumstances, on principle it should be held that even
though insolvency thereafter ensues, the trustee in bankruptcy
should not be permitted to recover the corporate payments.4"
Even in jurisdictions which follow the English doctrine, the
contract of purchase, although ultra vires, being consummated,
should not be disturbed. On the other hand, in the very few
jurisdictions which hold that it is not only ultra vires but illegal
and against public policy as well for a corporation to acquire its
own shares, the contract though fully consummated seemingly
may be repudiated and the consideration recovered back.41 The
distinction between regarding the purchase as ultra vires and as
illegal, is obvious.42  Suppose a corporation organized to run a
retail groceries business contracts to purchase two performing
elephants. By no stretch of the human imagination could this be
called an illegal act, an act contra bonos mores. At most, the
purchase is simply unauthorized, that is to say ultra vires.
Second, suppose the contract is made when the corporation
is insolvent. Under such circumstances, the purchase is clearly
invalid, under either the English or the American doctrine, since
it jeopardizes the capital stock and diminishes the fund to which
creditors would naturally look.43  On elementary principles of
the law of fraud, the transaction should be vitiated.
Third, suppose the contract of purchase is made when the
corporation is solvent, but the payment of the purchase price
for the shares would cause insolvency. This transaction also
See my paper, "Piercing the Veil of Corporate Entity," 12 Columbia
Law Rev. 496, et seq.
"Joseph v. Raff, 82 N. Y. App. Div. 47, affd. short, 176 N. Y. 6II.
See also Tierney v. Butler, 144 Iowa 553.
Crandall v. Lincoln, 52 Conn. 73. Sed qu.
'But the Supreme Court of the United States seems repeatedly to have
overlooked this distinction. Thus see, Central Transportation Co. v Pull-
man's Palace Car Co., 139 U. S. 24; St. Louis, Vandalia & Terre Haute
R. Co. v. Terre Haute & Indianapolis R. Co., 145 U. S. 393. And so have
many other authorities. See Canfield & Wormser's Cases, Chap. V, sec.
3, passim.
"Hall v. Alabama etc. Co., 173 Ala. 398; Tiger Bros. v. Rogers etc.
Co., 96 Ark. i; Alevander v. Relfe, 74 Mo. 495; Currier v. Lebanon
Slate Co., 56 N. H. 262.
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should be condemned; and the contract regarded as unenforce-
able since fraudulent to creditors. 44 The creditors of a corpora-
tion which is being wound up, and who have a natural right to
look to paid up capital as the fund out of which their debts are
to be discharged, should not be forced to come into competition
with stockholders in the company who claim that the company
is bound to pay them a part of the capital. The transaction
is inchoate and the court should not be forced to compel its
completion.
Fourth, suppose the contract of purchase is made when the
corporation is solvent, but the corporation becomes insolvent
before payment is made or completed. Here again, the transac-
tion is inchoate. This situation was considered by the United
States Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in a
recent decision. 45  A New York corporation while solvent pur-
chased certain shares of its own stock giving a note for the
purchase price. When the note given in payment matured, the
corporation was insolvent. It was held unanimously that pay-
ment of the note should be postponed until after the claims of
general creditors had been satisfied. In other words, if at the
time the stockholder is to receive payment for the shares of
stock which he has sold, the payment by the corporation would
prejudice its creditors, payment cannot be enforced. On prin-
ciple and as a common law proposition this holding is sound,
since in no jurisdictions, English or American, should a cor-
poration ever be permitted to consummate a purchase of its
own shares where this might work a detriment or injustice to
creditors. Even though the corporation is solvent when the
agreement is made, the law should attach the condition that pay-
ment cannot be enforced if to enforce payment would deprive
the creditors of assets.
judge Rogers, in his opinion, found it unnecessary to pass
upon the case as a common law proposition because of the
express statutory provision in New York, which declares guilty
of a misdemeanor any directors who vote "to apply any portion
of the funds of a corporation, except surplus profits, directly
or indirectly, to the purchase of shares of its own stock." (Penal
Law of New York, section 664, subd. 5.) Quoting from the
opinion:
"Atlanta Assn. v. Smith, 141 Wis. 377. See also, 2 Va. Law Rev., at
p. 74. Cf. Trevor v. Whitworth, supra.
'In the matter of Fechhehner Fishel Co., Bankrupt, 212 Fed. 357 (1914),
opinion per Rogers, J.
CORPORATION'S POWER TO ACQUIRE ITS STOCK 187
"But we are not by any means to understand that a
corporation has a right to buy its own stock, simply
because it is solvent at the time, because if it becomes
insolvent thereafter and before payment has been made,
or if it is made insolvent by the transaction, the payment
cannot be made, for the Penal Law of the State makes
it a crime to apply anything but 'surplus profits' to the
purchase of the stock and there are no such profits which
can be applied."
One recent criticism of the decision 6 fails to refer to the
statutory prohibition upon which the decision is rested.
Another47 doubts "that the legislature intended by a provision
contained in the penal law to impose such a limitation upon
the power of the corporation as delineated in the corporation
law." This criticism fails to cite, apparently overlooking, the
decision of the Court of Appeals of New York upon the appli-
cability of this provision.4  The action therein was brought
upon a contract made by a corporation to purchase its own stock.
The action was defended by the corporation upon the ground
that the contract was not enforceable by reason of the provisions
of section 664 of the Penal Law, making it a misdemeanor for
directors to apply any of the funds of a corporation, except
surplus profits, to that purpose. The court held that the burden
of proof was upon the corporation of showing that there were
no surplus profits out of which the purchase could be made.
It is obvious that the court assumed that the purchase of shares
of its own stock out of capital stock would be improper. The
Court of Appeals said:-
"The contract itself, therefore, was perfectly legal
subject to certain limitations upon its enforceability. If
when the time came it had a sufficient surplus, the contract
would be enforced."
It follows that certainly under the New York statute, as
interpreted by the New York courts, if not indeed as a common
law proposition, the federal decision is sound. Its tendency is
commendable, since jurisdictions which permit a corporation to
acquire its own stock should, and do, carefully safeguard the
rights of creditors as primary and supreme.49
4627 Harvard Law Rev., 747-75o.
414 Columbia Law Rev., 451.
'Richards v. Ernest Wiener Co., 2o7 N. Y. 59 (1912), aff'g. 145 App.
Div. 353.
' Clapp v. Peterson. supra. But cf. Cole v. Cole Realty Co., 169 Mich.
347.
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One factor overlooked by many decisions dealing with this
subject is the practical distinction, as obvious to business men
as it should be to the courts, and plainly recognized by the New
York statute, between a purchase of its own shares by a cor-
poration out of capital, and a similar purchase out of surplus.
Where the purchase is made from surplus, it is difficult to see
how creditors can be injured, and if the corporation as a whole
is benefited by the purchase, there seems no valid reason for
forbidding the directors to employ the corporate surplus in this
manner.50
On principle, a purchase by a private corporation of its own
shares from surplus, should be upheld by the courts,
(I) Provided a legitimate and proper corporate object is
advanced.
(2) Provided the condition of corporate affairs warrants it.
(3) Provided the transaction is designed and carried out in
entire good faith.
(4) Provided the corporation receives full and clear value.
(5) Provided there is intended and there results no undue
advantage to a few favored stockholders at the expense
of the remainder.
(6) Provided the rights of creditors are not jeopardized.
If the rights of creditors and the rights of stockholders are
thus safeguarded, and if purchase be permitted from surplus
alone as distinguished from capital stock, there would seem no
valid reason for denying to a corporation the right to acquire
shares of its own stock.51 On the contrary, to deny the right
under such conditions and circumstances, would unduly hamper
corporate activity and usefulness and the serviceability of the
private corporation as a type of business organization.
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See Lowe v. Pioneer Threshing Co., 70 Fed. 646, semble; Clark v.
E. C. Clark Machine Co., 151 Mich. 416. In Hainor v. Taylor-Rice
Engineering Co., 84 Fed. 392, the burden of proof was placed upon
plantiff, the vendor, to show a surplus. Cf. Richards v. Ernest Wiener
Co., supra, where the New York court held the burden to be upon the
corporation, the vendee, to prove that there was no surplus out of which
the purchase of its shares could lawfully be made.
'See Price v. Pine Mt. Iron Co., 32 S. W. (Ky. Ct. App.) 267.
